JAMES M. FINBERG (SBN 114850) 1 **EVE H. CERVANTEZ (SBN 164709)** 2 CORINNE F. JOHNSON (SBN 287385) San Francisco County Superior Court Altshuler Berzon LLP 3 177 Post Street, Suite 300 San Francisco, California 94108 SEP 14 2017 4 Telephone: (415) 421-7151 (415) 362-8064 Facsimile: 5 E-mail: jfinberg@altshulerberzon.com ecervantez@altshulerberzon.com 6 ciohnson@altshulerberzon.com 7 KELLY M. DERMODY (SBN 171716) ANNE B. SHAVER (SBN 255928) 8 MICHELLE LAMY (SBN 308174) Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP 9 275 Battery St., 29th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 10 Telephone: (415) 956-1000 Facsimile: (415) 956-1008 11 E-mail: kdermody@lchb.com ashaver@lchb.com mlamy@lchb.com 12 13 Attorneys for Plaintiffs KELLY ELLIS, HOLLY PEASE, and KELLI WISURI, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly 14 situated 15 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 16 **COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO** 17 Case No. CGC - 17 - 56 1299 18 KELLY ELLIS, HOLLY PEASE, and KELLI WISURI, individually and on behalf of all 19 others similarly situated, CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 20 Plaintiffs, 1. Violation of California Equal Pay Act (Labor Code §§1197.5, 1194.5) 21 2. Failure to Pay All Wages Due to Discharged v. and Quitting Employees (Labor Code §§201-22 GOOGLE, INC., 203, 1194.5) 3. Unfair and Unlawful Business Practices (Bus. 23 Defendant. & Prof. Code §17200) 4. Declaratory Judgment (C.C.P. §1060 et seq.) 24 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 25 26 27 28

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs Kelly Ellis, Holly Pease, and Kelli Wisuri (collectively "Plaintiffs"), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, are informed and believe, and thereon allege, as follows:

INTRODUCTION

- 1. Plaintiffs bring this class action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of a class defined as all women employed by Defendant Google, Inc. ("Google") in California at any time during the time period beginning four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of trial in this action ("Class Period").
- 2. Throughout the Class Period and throughout California, Google has discriminated and continues to discriminate against its female employees by systematically paying them lower compensation than Google pays to male employees performing substantially similar work under similar working conditions, in violation of the California Equal Pay Act, Labor Code §1197.5. Google's failure to pay women and men equal compensation for substantially similar work is not justified by any lawful reason.
- 3. Throughout the Class Period and throughout California, Google has discriminated and continues to discriminate against its female employees by paying female employees less than male employees with similar skills, experience, and duties; by assigning and keeping women in job ladders and levels with lower compensation ceilings and advancement opportunities than those to which men with similar skills, experience, and duties are assigned and kept; and by promoting fewer women and promoting women more slowly than it has promoted similarly-qualified men. The net result of this systemic discrimination is that Google pays women less than men for comparable work.
- 4. At all relevant times, Google has known or should have known of the pay disparity between its female and male employees, yet Google has failed to equalize men's and women's pay for substantially similar work. Google's failure to pay female employees the same compensation paid to male employees for substantially similar work has been and is willful.
- 5. As a result of Google's discriminatory and unlawful pay, job assignment, and promotion policies and/or practices, Plaintiffs and class members have been denied opportunities

and fair wages during the Class Period, and they are entitled to wages due, interest thereon, and liquidated damages. In addition to damages, Plaintiffs also seek declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining Google from continuing to pay women less than men for substantially similar work, including by segregating women into lesser compensated jobs than men with similar skills and experience; and from failing to promote women at the same rate or pace as men.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 6. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter because Google is a corporation that maintains its headquarters in California, is licensed to do business in California, regularly conducts business in California, and committed and continues to commit the unlawful acts alleged herein in California.
- 7. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §395.5. Google has an office in San Francisco, which is where many class members have worked and continue to work for Google. Google's obligation to pay its female employees equally to its male employees, and its liability for failing to do so, therefore arise in, among other counties, the County of San Francisco.

PARTIES

- 8. Plaintiff Kelly Ellis is a woman who was employed by Google as a Software Engineer at Google's Mountain View office from approximately May 2010 to approximately July 2014.
- 9. Plaintiff Holly Pease is a woman who was employed by Google as a Manager, Corporate Network Engineering; Manager, Business Systems Integration; Manager, Corporate Data Warehouse/Reporting Team; and Senior Manager, Business Systems Integration, at Google's Mountain View office and, for her final year, at Google's Sunnyvale office, from approximately August 2005 to approximately February 2016.
- 10. Plaintiff Kelli Wisuri is a woman who was employed by Google as a Sales Communications Specialist and Google Brand Evangelist, Executive Communications Program, at Google's Mountain View office from approximately October 2012 to approximately January 2015.

- 11. On information and belief, Google paid Plaintiffs Ellis, Pease, and Wisuri less than men for substantially equal or similar work, including, but not limited to, assigning and keeping Plaintiffs in lower compensation levels than similarly qualified men performing substantially similar work and assigning and keeping Plaintiffs in job ladders and levels that had lower compensation ceilings than the job ladders and levels of similarly qualified men performing substantially similar work.
- 12. Google is a corporation that develops and sells technology-related services and products. Google's San Francisco office is located at 345 Spear Street, San Francisco, California 94105. Google's headquarters is located at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043. Upon information and belief, Google employs over 21,000 employees at its Mountain View office and also has employees at its six other office locations throughout California.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

- 13. In or around September 2015, the United States Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs ("OFCCP") initiated a compliance review of Google's Mountain View headquarters. OFCCP performed a statistical regression analysis of the compensation data for all approximately 21,000 employees at Google's Mountain View office for the year 2015. That analysis "found systemic compensation disparities against women pretty much across the entire workforce." OFCCP's analysis showed six to seven standard deviations between pay for men and women in nearly every job classification in 2015.² Two standard deviations is considered statistically significant; six or seven standard deviations means there is a one in 100 million chance that the disparity is occurring randomly or by chance.
- 14. Throughout the Class Period and throughout California, Google has paid women less than men for substantially equal or similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions.

In re OFCCP v. Google, Inc., Dep't of Labor, ALJ Case No. 2017-OFC-08004 (April 7, 2017 hearing) at 48 (testimony by OFCCP Regional Director Janette Wipper).

² "Google Deliberately Confuses Its Employees, Fed Says," *Wired*, July 25, 2017 (quoting Janet Herold, Regional Solicitor for OFCCP).

- 15. Throughout the Class Period, Google's compensation, assignment, and promotion policies and practices have been and continue to be centrally determined and uniformly applied to all of Google's employees throughout its California office locations.
- 16. Throughout the Class Period, Google has maintained and continues to maintain a centrally determined and uniform set of policies and/or practices for determining employees' compensation throughout California, including centralized policies and/or practices for setting employees' initial pay and centralized policies and/or practices for giving employees pay raises, bonuses, and company equity. For example, Google's offices throughout California use a common organizational structure, organizing employees by job levels and ladders. Google's centralized pay structure establishes corporate-imposed compensation ranges based on employees' job ladder and level. These compensation ranges are set on a company-wide basis and apply across all of Google's California offices.
- 17. Throughout the Class Period and throughout California, Google has maintained and continues to maintain a centrally determined and uniformly applied policy and/or practice of paying its female employees less than male employees for substantially equal or similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions.
- 18. Under Google's organizational structure, higher job levels receive better compensation than lower levels, including higher salaries and opportunities for bonuses, raises, and company equity. "Technical" job ladders have more generous salary bands and compensation than "non-technical" job ladders, irrespective of the job duties performed. In addition, certain jobs and job ladders receive higher compensation and greater advancement opportunities, even in comparison to jobs and job ladders that, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, require substantially similar work.
- 19. Throughout the Class Period and throughout California, Google has channeled and segregated, and continues to channel and segregate, women on the basis of their sex into lower compensation levels and into less-compensated and less-favorable job ladders and levels than men with equal or lesser qualifications and/or men performing substantially similar work.

Google has had and maintains an ongoing and continuous policy and/or practice of paying women less than men with similar qualifications and duties and of promoting men more frequently and to higher-paying job ladders and levels than women with similar qualifications and duties.

20. Google performs internal pay equity analyses on an annual basis. Google is also required to maintain records of the wage rates, job classifications, and other terms and conditions of employment of all of its employees throughout California. Google therefore knew or should have known that it paid female employees less than it paid their male counterparts for performing substantially equal or similar work, yet Google took no steps at any time during the Class Period to pay women equally to men as required by the Labor Code, §1197.5 et seq.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

21. Plaintiffs bring their first through fourth causes of action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of the following proposed class ("Class"):

All women employed by Google in California at any time during the time period beginning four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of trial in this action.

- 22. This action is appropriately suited for a class action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 382 because there exists an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous Class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.
- 23. <u>Numerosity and Ascertainability</u>. The size of the Class makes a class action both necessary and efficient. On information and belief, the proposed Class includes thousands of current and former female Google employees located across California. Members of the Class are ascertainable through Google's records, but are so numerous that joinder of all individual Class members would be impractical.
- 24. <u>Predominant Common Questions of Law and Fact</u>. Common questions of law and fact affecting the rights of all Class members predominate over individualized issues. These common questions include, but are not limited to: (a) whether Google has a systemic policy and/or practice of paying its female employees at wage rates lower than those paid to its male

employees performing substantially equal or similar work under similar conditions; (b) whether Google's systemic policy and/or practice of paying its female employees at wage rates lower than those paid to their male counterparts violates the California Equal Pay Act, as amended, Labor Code §1197.5 et seq.; (c) whether Google has a systemic policy and/or practice of assigning and maintaining women in lower-paid job levels or job ladders than men; and (d) whether Google's systemic policy and/or practice of paying its female employees at wage rates lower than those paid to their male counterparts was willful.

- 25. <u>Typicality</u>: Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the Class as a whole because Plaintiffs are women who were employed by Google in California during the Class Period and were paid less than male employees for substantially equal or similar work. Upon information and belief, Google has applied uniform wage rate, promotion, and level and job ladder policies and practices to its employees throughout California at all times throughout the Class Period.
- 26. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class because their individual interests are consistent with, and not antagonistic to, the interests of the Class, and because Plaintiffs have selected counsel who have the requisite resources and ability to prosecute this case as a class action and are experienced labor and employment attorneys who have successfully litigated other cases involving similar issues, including in class actions.
- 27. Superiority of Class Mechanism. Class certification is appropriate because common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members. Google's liability in this case is based on uniform company policies and procedures. The compensation owed to each individual Class Member is small in relation to the expense and burden of individual litigation to recover that compensation. The prosecution of separate actions against Google by individual Class Members could create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Google. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy set forth herein.

ALLEGATIONS OF NAMED PLAINTIFFS

Plaintiff Kelly Ellis

- 28. Plaintiff Ellis was hired by Google in 2010 as a frontend Software Engineer on the Google Photos team. During the hiring process, Google asked Ms. Ellis about her prior salary. Google then offered Ms. Ellis the same base salary as she received at her prior job.
- 29. Ms. Ellis graduated from the University of Virginia in 2006 with a bachelor's degree in applied mathematics and a minor in computer science. At the time of her hiring, she had four years' experience working in backend software engineering. Google, however, placed her into Level 3 on the Software Engineering ladder. Level 3 is the level to which Google typically assigns new college graduates.
- 30. Within a few weeks of hiring Ms. Ellis, Google hired a male software engineer onto Ms. Ellis's team. Although that male engineer, like Ms. Ellis, had graduated in 2006, Google placed him into the higher-paying Level 4 on the Software Engineering ladder. Google also placed and promoted other male software engineers with qualifications equal to or less than Ms. Ellis's qualifications into Level 4 and higher on Ms. Ellis's team and on other similar software engineering teams.
- 31. Level 4 Software Engineers receive substantially higher salary and opportunities for bonuses, raises, and equity than Level 3 Software Engineers.
- 32. Ms. Ellis received excellent performance reviews. Senior software engineers that she worked with quickly recognized that she had been under-levelled, and suggested she apply for a promotion consistent with her skill and experience. But the first time Ms. Ellis applied for a promotion, Google denied her application. Although Google acknowledged her excellent performance, it refused to pay her at the same rate as similar men on the basis that she had not been at the company long enough to merit a promotion. Ms. Ellis eventually obtained the higher-paying Level 4 designation that was handed to her male counterparts on their first day on the job—but by that time, her male counterparts were on their way to even higher levels and compensation for similar work, ensuring that she could never catch up on the gender pay gap.

18

17

20

19

22

21

23 24

25

26

27

28

- 33. There is a false and gendered perception at Google that backend software engineering is more technically rigorous, and therefore more prestigious, than frontend software engineering. Google pays backend engineers more than frontend and fasttracks them for promotion. On the teams Ms. Ellis worked with and observed at Google, almost all backend software engineers were men. Almost all female software engineers, however, were frontend engineers. The skills required to perform these jobs are equal or substantially similar.
- 34. Google assigned male engineers that joined Ms. Ellis's Google Photos team at or around the same time as Ms. Ellis to backend engineering jobs. Despite Ms. Ellis's prior experience in backend engineering, and her qualifications, ability, and desire to work in backend engineering, Google assigned her to an occupationally-segregated frontend engineering role upon hiring her. Although Ms. Ellis was eventually assigned to backend engineering work, on information and belief, for the entire time that Ms. Ellis worked at Google, she was paid less than men for substantially equal or similar work performed under similar working conditions, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility.
- 35. Ms. Ellis resigned from Google in approximately July 2014 because of the sexist culture at Google.
- 36. On information and belief, for the entire time that Ms. Ellis worked at Google, she was paid less than men for substantially equal or similar work performed under similar working conditions, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility.

Plaintiff Holly Pease

- 37. Plaintiff Pease was hired by Google in 2005 as a corporate network manager. At the time of her hiring, she had over 10 years' experience working as a network engineer, Director of Network Engineering, and Vice President of Network Engineering. Shortly after she was hired, she became a data warehouse manager.
- 38. Over the next several years, Ms. Pease managed engineering teams that developed software applications, including data warehouses, services, and data analytics, for Google's internal infrastructure. As a senior manager, she eventually managed a total of about 50 software

engineers and analysts across multiple teams. During that time, she received excellent performance reviews for her work.

- 39. Most of the employees Ms. Pease managed were on "technical" job ladders, including the Software Engineering ladder. The one other senior manager in her group was a man, and he was also on a "technical" ladder. Yet, despite Ms. Pease's many years of engineering experience, and her many years of managing software engineers on technical software development projects within the company, Google placed and kept her in the "non-technical" Business Systems ladder, with lower compensation and opportunities for upward mobility.
- 40. Compensation, including salary, bonuses, pay raises, and company equity, is significantly greater in the "technical" ladders, such as Software Engineering, than in the "non-technical" Business Systems ladder.
- 41. Around 2013, Google reorganized its ladders to transition engineers from the Business Systems ladder to "technical" ladders. Ms. Pease coached those of her employees who were still on the "non-technical" ladder on how to pass the technical interviews necessary to convert to the "technical" ladder. Almost all of these employees were re-assigned to the higher-paying Software Engineering ladder, including a male manager one level below her whom she personally coached, and who, despite performing poorly on a technical interview, was assigned to the Software Engineering ladder because he managed software engineers. The transitioned employees' job duties did not change after their re-assignment to a higher-paying "technical" ladder.
- 42. Google, however, denied Ms. Pease a fair opportunity to be paid at the same rate as similar employees on the "technical" ladder. Ms. Pease's two interviewers, both men, did not ask her any technical questions, and one interviewer did not even bother to take notes of the meeting with her. Google ultimately denied Ms. Pease re-assignment to the higher-paying "technical" ladder on the pretense that she lacked technical ability, even though she had decades of technical experience and even though she—like the male manager she coached into a similar re-assignment—managed software engineers.

22²

- 43. While Ms. Pease was on medical leave, Google transferred the employees she managed to another group. When she returned from medical leave, the only position made available to her was a non-engineering position in physical security. Ms. Pease received excellent performance reviews in her new position. Nonetheless, due to the lack of technical and engineering opportunities available to her and other women at Google, the denial of compensation commensurate with her skills relative to similar men, and the stalling out of her career at the company, Ms. Pease resigned in February 2016.
- 44. On information and belief, for the entire time that Ms. Pease worked at Google, she was paid less than men for substantially equal or similar work performed under similar working conditions, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility.

Plaintiff Kelli Wisuri

- 45. Plaintiff Wisuri joined Google sales in October 2012 when her company was acquired by Google. Ms. Wisuri graduated from the University of California–Berkeley in 2007 with a bachelor's degree in philosophy. At the time of her hiring, she had two-and-a-half years' experience working as a salesperson. Google, however, placed her into Level 2. Upon information and belief, Level 2 is the lowest level available to permanent, full-time employees. Upon information and belief, Google placed and places male employees with similar sales qualifications and experience and/or doing substantially equal or similar work into Level 3 or higher.
- A6. Despite her sales role, Google did not place Ms. Wisuri on the Sales ladder. Rather, upon information and belief, Google placed Ms. Wisuri on the Sales Enablement ladder. Unlike the Sales ladder, which is paid on commission, the Sales Enablement ladder is compensated by salary. As a result, Sales Enablement jobs have considerably less compensation potential than Sales jobs. Almost all of the employees on the Sales teams Ms. Wisuri worked with were men. About 50% of the employees she encountered with Sales Enablement jobs, however, were women.
- 47. Ms. Wisuri also worked as a Google Brand Evangelist in the Executive Communications Program. Her job duties included preparing and presenting sales pitches to the

executive teams of clients with more than \$10 million in brand marketing sales to Google. Her role was a dedicated part of Google's "sales funnel," and she worked with Sales teams both before and after the pitches. During her time at Google, she was responsible for bringing in significant new revenue to Google. But although she was performing work that was substantially equal or similar to that performed by her male counterparts on the Sales team, she remained on the Sales Enablement ladder, which is less compensated and, upon information and belief, provides fewer opportunities for career advancement into higher-paying jobs.

- 48. On information and belief, for the entire time that Ms. Wisuri worked at Google, she was paid less than men for substantially equal or similar work performed under similar working conditions, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility.
- 49. Due to the lack of opportunities for advancement for women at Google, Ms. Wisuri resigned from Google in January 2015.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Violation of the California Equal Pay Act
Cal. Labor Code §§1197.5 et seq., 1194.5
(Brought by Plaintiffs Holly Pease and Kelli Wisuri on Behalf of Themselves and the Plaintiff Class)

- 50. Plaintiffs hereby re-allege and incorporate by reference all allegations in each and every preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.
- 51. Google has discriminated and continues to discriminate against Plaintiffs and all Class members in violation of California Labor Code §1197.5 et seq. by paying its female employees at wage rates less than the wage rates paid to its male employees for substantially equal or similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions, throughout the Class Period.
- 52. Google's failure to pay women and men equal wages for performing substantially equal or similar work is not justified by any lawful reason.
- 53. Google has willfully violated California Labor Code §1197.5 by intentionally, knowingly, and/or deliberately paying women less than men for substantially equal or similar work throughout the Class Period.

- 54. As a result of Google's ongoing conduct, violation of California Labor Code §1197.5, and/or willful discrimination, Plaintiffs Pease and Wisuri and Class members have suffered and will continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings, lost benefits, and other financial loss, as well as non-economic damages.
- 55. Plaintiffs Pease and Wisuri and Class members are therefore entitled to all legal and equitable remedies available under law, including wages, interest, and liquidated damages.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

Failure to Pay All Wages Due to Discharged and Quitting Employees
Cal. Labor Code §§201-203, 1194.5
(Brought by Plaintiffs Pease and Wisuri on Behalf of Themselves and the Plaintiff Class)

- 56. Plaintiffs hereby re-allege and incorporate by reference all allegations in each and every preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.
- 57. Pursuant to California Labor Code §§201, 202, and 203, Google is required to pay all earned and unpaid wages to an employee who is discharged or quits. California Labor Code §201 mandates that if an employer discharges an employee, the employee's wages accrued and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable immediately. California Labor Code §202 mandates that if an employee quits, the employee's wages accrued and unpaid at the time of quitting are due and payable no later than 72 hours after the employee quits his or her employment, unless the employee provided at least 72 hours of notice of his or her intention to quit, in which case the wages are due immediately at the time of quitting.
- 58. California Labor Code §203 provides that if an employer willfully fails to pay in accordance with California Labor Code §§201 and 202 any wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, the employer is liable for waiting time penalties in the form of continued compensation to the employee at the same rate for up to 30 work days.
- 59. By intentionally and deliberately paying Plaintiffs Pease and Wisuri and Class members lower wages than wages paid to their male counterparts for performing substantially similar work, Google has willfully failed and continues to fail to pay all accrued wages due to Plaintiffs Pease and Wisuri and Class members who have been discharged or who have quit, in violation of Labor Code §§201 and 202, respectively.

60. As a result of Google's unlawful actions and omissions, Plaintiffs Pease and Wisuri and former employee Class members are entitled to all available statutory penalties, including the waiting time penalties provided in California Labor Code §203, together with interest thereon, as well as other available remedies.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

Unlawful and Unfair Business Practices Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq. (Brought by All Plaintiffs on Behalf of Themselves and the Plaintiff Class)

- 61. Plaintiffs hereby re-allege and incorporate by reference all allegations in each and every preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.
- 62. Google's policies and/or practices of paying female employees less than male employees for substantially similar work performed, of discriminating against female employees in compensation and the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment on the basis of their sex, and of failing to timely pay female employees who are discharged or who quit all wages earned and due constitute business practices because Google's acts and omissions as alleged herein have been done repeatedly over a significant period of time, and in a systematic manner, to the detriment of Plaintiffs and Class Members.
- 63. Google's acts and omissions, as alleged herein, violate the California Equal Pay Act, as amended, Labor Code §1197.5 et seq. the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code § 12940, and California Labor Code §§201, 202, and 203, and therefore constitute unlawful business practices prohibited by Business & Professions Code §17200 et seq.
- 64. Google's acts and omissions, as alleged herein, constitute unfair business practices prohibited by Business & Professions Code §17200 et seq. Google's business practices of paying women less than men for substantially similar work, of assigning and keeping women in lower levels and less highly compensated job ladders than similarly-qualified men, and of failing to promote women cause harm to Plaintiffs and Class members that outweighs any reason Google may have for doing so. Google's business practices as alleged herein are also immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and offensive to the established public policies of ensuring women and men are paid equally for performing substantially similar work, as reflected in both

the California Equal Pay Act, Cal. Labor Code §1197.5 et seq., and the federal Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §206(d) et seq., and ensuring women are not discriminated against in the workplace, as reflected in both the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov't Code §12940 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq.

- 65. As a result of its unlawful and/or unfair business practices, Google has reaped and continues to reap unfair and illegal profits at the expense of Plaintiffs and Class members.

 Accordingly, Google should be disgorged of its illegal profits, and Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to restitution with interest of such ill-gotten profits in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 66. Google's unlawful and/or unfair business practices entitle Plaintiffs and Class members to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and other equitable relief available under law.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Declaratory Judgment Cal. C.C.P. § 1060 et seq.

(Brought by All Plaintiffs on Behalf of Themselves and the Plaintiff Class)

- 67. Plaintiffs hereby re-allege and incorporate by reference all allegations in each and every preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein.
- 68. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties as set forth above, for which Plaintiffs desire a declaration of rights and other relief available pursuant to the California Declaratory Judgment Act, C.C.P. §1060 et seq.
- 69. A declaratory judgment is necessary and proper in that Plaintiffs contend that Google has committed and continues to commit the violations set forth above and, on information and belief, Google will deny that it has done so and/or will continue to commit such acts.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, respectfully pray for relief against Google as follows:

1. For an order certifying this action as a class action;

James M. Finberg CORINNE F. JOHNSON KELLY M. DERMODY ANNE B. SHAVER 16 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

MICHELLE LAMY Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class

		CM-010
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar James M. Finberg (SBN 114850)	number, and address): Kelly M. Dermody (SBN 171716)	FOR COURT USE ONLY
Altshuler Berzon LLP	Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein L	LP
177 Post Street, Suite 300	275 Battery St., 29th Floor	
San Francisco, CA 94108	San Francisco, CA 94111	
TELEPHONE NO.: 415.421.7151 ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Kelly Ellis, Holly Pea	FAX NO.: 415.362.8064	San Francisco Course E
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF Sa		Suny Suna
STREET ADDRESS: 400 McAllister St.	II Flancisco	SEP SEP Count
MAILING ADDRESS: 400 McAllister St.		SEP 14 2017
CITY AND ZIP CODE: San Francisco, CA 94	1109	AV. CERK OF THE
BRANCH NAME: Civic Center Courtho	use	CLERK OF THE COURT
CASE NAME:		- the live
Google, Inc. v. Kelly Ellis, et al.		Deputy Clork
CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET	Complex Case Designation	CASE NUMBER:
✓ Unlimited Limited (Amount (Amount	Counter Joinder	CCC
demanded demanded is	Filed with first appearance by defenda	ant Judge: 1/-561200
exceeds \$25,000) \$25,000 or less)	(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.402)	JUDGE - 17-561299
Items 1–6 beld	ow must be completed (see instructions o	
Check one box below for the case type that best describes this case:		
Auto Tort		rovisionally Complex Civil Litigation
Auto (22)		Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.400–3.403)
Uninsured motorist (46)	Rule 3.740 collections (09)	Antitrust/Trade regulation (03)
Other PI/PD/WD (Personal Injury/Property	Other collections (09)	Construction defect (10)
Damage/Wrongful Death) Tort	Insurance coverage (18)	Mass tort (40)
Asbestos (04)	Other contract (37)	Securities litigation (28)
Product liability (24)	Real Property	Environmental/Toxic tort (30)
Medical malpractice (45)	Eminent domain/Inverse Condemnation (14)	Insurance coverage claims arising from the
Other PI/PD/WD (23) Non-PI/PD/WD (Other) Tort	Wrongful eviction (33)	above listed provisionally complex case types (41)
Business tort/unfair business practice (07)		nforcement of Judgment
Civil rights (08)	Unlawful Detainer	Enforcement of judgment (20)
Defamation (13)		liscellaneous Civil Complaint
Fraud (16)	Residential (32)	RICO (27)
Intellectual property (19)	Drugs (38)	Other complaint (not specified above) (42)
Professional negligence (25)	Indicial Paylow	' ' ' ' ' '
Other non-PI/PD/WD tort (35)	Asset forfeiture (05)	liscellaneous Civil Petition
Employment	Petition re: arbitration award (11)	Partnership and corporate governance (21)
Wrongful termination (36)	Writ of mandate (02)	Other petition (not specified above) (43)
Other employment (15)	Other judicial review (39)	
2. This case is is not complex under rule 3.400 of the California Rules of Court. If the case is complex, mark the		
factors requiring exceptional judicial management:		
a. Large number of separately represented parties d. Large number of witnesses		
b. 🗹 Extensive motion practice raising difficult or novel e. 🔛 Coordination with related actions pending in one or more courts		
issues that will be time-consuming to resolve in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court Substantial amount of documentary evidence f Substantial posting amount indicial supervision.		
- Cubstantial posqueginent judicial supervision		
3. Remedies sought (check all that apply): a 🗸 monetary b. 🗸 nonmonetary; declaratory or injunctive relief c punitive		
4. Number of causes of action (specify): 4		
5. This case is is not a class action suit.		
6. If there are any known related cases, file and serve a notice of related case. (You may use form CM-015.)		
Date:) Chur
James M. Finberg (TYPE OR PRINT NAME)		NATURE OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY FOR PARTY)
NOTICE		
• Plaintiff must file this cover sheet with the first paper filed in the action or proceeding (except small claims cases or cases filed		
under the Probate Code, Family Code, or Welfare and Institution\$ Code). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.220.) Failure to file may result		
in sanctions.File this cover sheet in addition to any cove	r sheet required by local court rule	İ
• If this case is complex under rule 3.400 et seq. of the California Rules of Court, you must serve a copy of this cover sheet on all		
other parties to the action or proceeding. • Unless this is a collections case under rule 3.740 or a complex case, this cover sheet will be used for statistical purposes only		
r – vincaa iila ja o wiidchulla Case under fille.		I WIII DE LISEO TOT STATISTICAL NUMAGAG ANIV